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ARTICLES
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A New Approach in Water Management or
Business as Usual? The Milk River, Montana
The allocation, management and development of water in the
West is a highly dynamic area. The basic law governing the allocation of western water has not changed substantially in over 100
years and is steeped in archaic concepts fashioned to address situations no longer relevant.' Why this dichotomy between what
is happening on the ground and in the law? In short, the resource itself, our demand on it, and our view of its value is changing at a rate that outpaces the ability of the law to adapt. Supply
fluctuates on both a seasonal and long-term basis. Estimates indicate that 1.2 billion people globally experience a shortage of
potable water and given current population trends, that number
will only increase. 2 Many Indian reservations in the United
* Assistant Professor, Environmental Studies Program, San Francisco State University. Mediator for the Walker River dispute. Former legal counsel, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission. Lead counsel on negotiations to settle
the reserved water rights of the Fort Belknap Reservation, the Chippewa Cree of
the Rocky Boy's Reservation, the National Park Service, and the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, in Montana. L.L.M. Northwestern School of Law, Lewis and Clark
College, J.D. University of California, Hastings College of the Law, M.S. Geology,
University of Washington, B.S. Geology, University of California, Davis. The author would like to acknowledge Professors Janet Neuman, Michael Blumm, and
Janice Weis of Northwestern School of Law at Lewis and Clark College, and Professor Brian Gray of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law for their
review and comments. The author would also like to thank the participants of the
Milk River process for their willingness to discuss negotiations.
I See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN:
WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST

LAND,

25 (1992) (referring to prior appropriation

as a "lord of yesterday").
2 Arun P. Elhance, Water Scarcity in the Third World, in HYDROPOLITICS IN THE
THIRD WORLD:

(1999).
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States, like the developing world, lack potable water.3 In the
West, growing urban demand and recent recognition of tribal
rights and critical habitat needs place increasing strain on .this
finite, yet ever renewable resource.4
To meet these needs in the face of growing concern about the
impact of water development on the integrity of ecosystems, the
focus of water policy both globally and in the West has moved
away from the twentieth century emphasis on water development
and toward improvements in water management and efficiency.5
Many of the efforts to solve these growing concerns conflict with
the archaic law governing water allocation. Western water
policymakers and practitioners are in a constant struggle to introduce sufficient flexibility into the law in order to address changes
in supply, demand, and values.6 In the effort to address modern
problems, negotiation plays an increasingly important role. Collaborative processes aimed at resolving local issues are taking
place in many of the water basins in the West. Frequently, what
began as a focused process to settle, for example, tribal water
right claims, has expanded to cover basin-wide issues. The current ad hoc approach to settlement has given rise to a variety of
processes, thus providing a fertile ground for testing a variety of
approaches and solutions designed to address water allocation

3 See, e.g., MSE-HKM Engineering, Municipal,Rural and IndustrialWater Supply
System Needs Assessment, Rocky Boy's Indian Reservation, preparedfor the United

States Bureau of Reclamation (Jan. 1996).
4 Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV.

317, 321-22 (1985).
5 Peter H. Gleick, The Changing Water Paradigm, in THE WORLD'S WATER 19981999, THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 9 (1999).
6 See, e.g., LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, FROM RECLAMATION TO SUSTAIN-ABILITY: WATER, AGRICULTURE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE AMERICAN WEST 232

(1999) (discussing the problem created by a rigid legal system that has not kept pace
with change in water-use preferences); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of
Getting Names Right: The Myth of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVmL. L.
AND POL'Y REV. 317 (2000) (discussing the growing need to reallocate water from
agricultural to urban and environmental uses); David H. Getches, From Askhabad,
to Wellton-Mohawk, to Los Angeles: The Drought in Water Policy, 64 U. COLO. L.

REV. 523 (1993) ("The goals of water policy tend to be confined to respecting existing rights and rewarding development. Western states are lately realizing that
economic stability, human health, ecological balance, and survival of urban and rural
communities all have a nexus in water."); Janet C. Neuman, Adaptive Management:
How Water Law Needs to Change, 31 ENvTL. L. REP. 11432 (2001) (discussing the
need to introduce flexible "adaptive" management into the prior appropriation
system).
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problems.' The growing use of negotiation to solve problems
which are not adequately addressed by existing law may herald a
new era for water distribution and management in the West. An
era tailored to the problems faced by specific water basins and
structured around governance that mimics basin boundaries.
This paper explores one such effort in a typical western basin, the
Milk River.8
The Milk River on the east side of the continental divide in
north-central Montana, like many basins in the West, faces
problems associated with multiple jurisdictions, limited and variable water supply, and changing water needs. Its history is a testament to our changing federal policy toward the development
and use of public lands and water in the West. In 1805, when
Meriwether Lewis described the milky stream laden with glacial
silt entering the Missouri River, the stream's banks were home to
bison, grizzly bear, and wolf. The territory of the Milk River was
hunted by the Blackfeet and Sioux Indians. Today, the grizzly
bear and wolf are gone, and the only bison are in an introduced
herd on the Fort Belknap Reservation. The Milk River Basin is
now home to four Indian reservations, numerous Indian allotments, and is the recipient of one of the earliest reclamation
projects developed by the federal government. The basin is also
the site of the dispute that led to the Winters Doctrine, the
United States Supreme Court's recognition of Indian and federal
reserved water rights. However, the recognition of those rights
on the Fort Belknap Reservation in 1908 did not address their
quantification. Since that recognition, a national park and several national wildlife refuges have been established in the basin.
Also, bull trout, a listed species in streams on the western side of
the Continental Divide under the Endangered Species Act, have

7 See, e.g., David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have
FederalLaws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States' Role?, 20 STAN. ENvmL. L.J. 3,

5-6 (2001) ("[t]hese [locally-driven] approaches ... can serve as laboratories for
incubating proposals for systematic change at the state level"); see also A. Dan
Tarlock, Reconnecting Property Rights to Watersheds, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

69, 75 (2000) (noting that "[w]atershed management is once again
in vogue but in a more decentralized, ad hoc, stakeholder-driven form than previous
hydrologic governance efforts").
8 As legal counsel for the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission,
the author was lead negotiator for the State of Montana on negotiations to settle the
water rights of the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Belknap ReservaAND POL'Y REV.

tion in the Milk River Basin which is the subject of this article.
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been documented by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
in the Milk River's upper tributaries.
In 1979, the State of Montana launched a new program for the
resolution of water rights claimed for federal and Indian reservations through negotiation,9 and identified the Milk River Basin
as its highest priority.' ° In 1997, after years of data collection,
negotiations began in earnest among the State, the Gros Ventre
and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Belknap Reservation, and the
federal government. Similar to other tribal water negotiations
throughout the West, negotiators soon realized that no settlement would be possible without addressing issues of basin-wide
concern.
This Article explores the use of the tribal settlement process
on the Milk River to address two specific problems of broader
concern:
1. Water distribution and management in a basin with multiple
jurisdictions; and
2. Re-allocation of water to meet critical needs during drought.
The conclusion of the Article is that the measures applied in
the Milk River settlement are a major step toward solving the
problems created by current law and jurisdictional boundaries.
The Milk River measures provide a basin-wide forum for coordination of water management and enforcement, and eliminate
some of the inequities in the current system of water allocation,
but does not yet provide a system of water use that will sustain
the aquatic habitat. This Article is Part I in a three part series.
Part I of the series looks at a basin-wide effort to resolve management and storage allocation issues on the Truckee River in
Nevada and California. Part II concludes that the introduction of
flexible management to existing water storage infrastructure by
the Truckee River negotiations are overcoming substantial barriers to the reallocation of water. Part III of the series looks at the
processes used in achieving the Milk River and Truckee River
settlements and concludes that, while litigation or its threat may
be necessary to force consideration of non-economic interests,
such as aquatic habitat, negotiation offers the best means to arrive at solutions to improve water governance and allocation in
9 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-701 to -708 (2001).
10 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-321(2) (2001). Reasons

for prioritization of the Milk
River include: critical water shortage and the presence of unquantified water rights
for five Indian reservations, three national wildlife refuges, and one national park.
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the West. Part III also recommends changes to the current federal team process for participation in water negotiations in order
to provide accountability to national interests broader than the
United States' proprietary interests in the particular basin which
is the focus of the negotiation. In addition, Part III recommends
congressional prioritization of the expenditure of funds on water
settlements that promote a fair allocation of the benefits of the
water resource, movement toward sustainable use of the water
resource, and the use of federal subsidies only to the achievement of these ends.
Section I of this Article describes the current state of water law
in a basin with both appropriative and reserved water rights and
a federal reclamation project. Section II describes the Milk
River Basin and the water-related problems its inhabitants face.
Section III sets forth the process used in Montana to negotiatea
settlement and the solutions achieved.
I
WESTERN WATER LAW

Understanding the solutions developed on the Milk River requires background on the basic laws governing private and tribal
water allocation in the West, the doctrines of prior appropriation
and reserved water rights, and the complexity created by the
overlay of a federal reclamation project. However, western
water law is difficult to comprehend without an understanding of
the meaning and consequences of aridity.
A.

Aridity

No one who has driven through red rock country at sunrise or
has gotten their second flat tire in that same country at noon can
fail to appreciate the aridity of the West. No one who has floated
through sage-scented canyons on the whitewater of one of the
West's few untamed stretches of river can fail to appreciate its
irony. In the West, we are defined by aridity.1 '
Aridity refers to a basic lack of rainfall. In a vast area between
the Mississippi River and the Sierra Nevada Mountains, rainfall
is generally less than twenty inches per year, the amount needed
11

See, e.g.,

WALLACE STEGNER, THE AMERICAN WEST AS LIVING SPACE 8

("Aridity, and aridity alone, makes the various Wests one.").

(1987)
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to farm without irrigation. 2 Under the influence of aridity, westerners have a special relation with the West's major rivers.
These rivers control where they can and where they want to
live.' 3 John Wesley Powell, when surveying these arid regions in
the late 1800's, recognized that the major rivers of the West
would control its development.1 4 He recommended that the federal government eliminate the straight line rectangular survey so
dear to the engineer and draw jurisdictional boundaries along
topographic divides.15 He further recognized that these great rivers could not be developed for irrigation by individuals, and recommended the formation of collectives or irrigation districts for
the control of land and water.16 Powell's recommended policies
reflect a clear understanding of water as a public good. 7 However, Congress did not follow his recommendations when defining political boundaries. Irrigation districts were formed under
12 WALLACE

STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH

MERIDIAN:

JOHN WESLEY

214 (1953).
13 This concept is recognized in both our great legal writing and our great litera-

POWELL AND THE SECOND OPENING OF THE WEST

ture: "A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It offers a necessity of life
that must be rationed among those who have power over it." New Jersey v. New
York, 283 U.S. 336, 342; "Water is H 20, hydrogen two parts, oxygen one, but there is
also a third thing, that makes it water and nobody knows what that is." D.H. Lawrence, The Third Thing, in BIRDS, BEASTS AND THE THIRD THING (1932); "A very
little deficiency, even a slight distortion of the season in which the rain falls, makes
all the difference. My family homesteaded on the Montana-Saskatchewan border in
1915, and burned out by 1920, after laying the foundation for a little dust bowl by
plowing up a lot of buffalo grass. If the rains had been kind, my father would have
proved up on that land and become a naturalized Canadian. I estimate that I missed
becoming Canadian by no more than an inch or two of rain; but that same deficiency
confirmed me as a citizen of the West." STEGNER, supra note 11, at 6.
14 STEGNER, supra note 12, at 229. For discussion about how the rivers of the
West determined where Native Americans chose to live, see, e.g., BARBARA T. ANDREWS & MARIE SANSONE, WHO RUNS THE RIVERS? DAMS AND DECISIONS IN THE
NEW WEST 168 (1983) (referring to the fifteenth century canal systems of the
Hohokam Indians); Marfa Rosa Garcfa-Acevedo, The Confluence of Water, Patterns
of Settlement, and Constructions of the Border in the Imperial and Mexicali Valleys
(1900-1999), in REFLECTIONS ON WATER 57, 59 (Joachim Blatter & Helen Ingram
eds., 2001) ("the Colorado River was 'the most important natural factor influencing
native cultures in the delta"' (citations omitted)).
15 STEGNER,

supra note 12, at 227. See also,

MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT:

49 (1987) (noting that Powell
recommended that state boundaries follow the boundaries of the major water
basins).

THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER

16 STEGNER,
17

supra note 12, at 229.

See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 6, at 329-30 (concluding that water is a public

good because it is essential to life and therefore must be distributed fairly, and because it is an ambient resource-i.e., shared among users such that use by one affects all others).
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state law in response to development by the United States Bureau of Reclamation. However, this attempt at shared use rarely
encompassed an entire basin and thus conflicted with other water
use. States ignored much of Powell's advice concerning shared
development and shared water use. To understand the obstacles
facing those who now seek to develop, manage, share, or con-

serve water on a basin-wide basis, it is necessary to understand
the system developed instead.
B.

Prior Appropriation

During the same era as the Powell surveys, the West was valued primarily for exploitation of its vast resources, in particular,
its mineral wealth."8 The general rule is that water allocation and
management is left to state law. 19 State courts sought a means of
allocation that protected investment."0 These means did not consider that the West would become home to a population that
must share its water resources for diverse economic pursuits or
the havoc that dewatering of streams would play on habitats.
The result is the doctrine of prior appropriation which is followed
21
by most western states.
18 Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855).
19 California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158
(1935) (holding that the effect of the 1866 Mining Act as amended in 1870, the 1877
Desert Lands Act, and the 1891 Act governing right-of-way for canals and reservoirs
for public lands and reservations, was to sever the water right from the public land
leaving it available for appropriation under local law). See also United States v. Rio
Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 706 (1899) (stating with respect to the
same Acts that "the obvious purpose of congress [sic] was to give its assent, so far as
the public lands were concerned, to any system, although in contravention to the
common-law rule [of riparian rights], which permitted the appropriation of those
waters for legitimate industries"); cf. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435,
448 (1955) (Pelton Dam case) (held that the same Acts do not apply to reserved
land, only to public land defined as land subject to private appropriation and disposal under the public land laws).
20 See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 317 (noting that prior appropriation was
created to meet the needs of the mining camps); see also Dellapenna, supra note 6,
at 346 (noting that shared, riparian ownership only works when a resource is abundant, and identifying prior appropriation as. an attempt at creating private property
rights to encourage investment in the face of scarcity).
21 WELLS

A.

HUTCHINS,

WATER RIGHTS

LAWS

IN THE

NINETEEN

WESTERN

Vol. I, Chap. 7, 226 and Vol. II, Chap. 10, 6-14 (Misc. Pub. No. 1206, Natural
Resource Economics Div., Economic Research Service, USDA 1971). The other
form of rights for allocation of water-riparian rights-is followed by most eastern
states and by some western states in combination with prior appropriation. Riparian
law recognizes the right of landowners along a water source to reasonable use of
water from the source.
STATES,
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In practical terms, an appropriative right has certain key attributes that become critical in times of drought. First, a water right
exists to the extent of the application of water to a beneficial
use. Second, in times of shortage, allocation occurs on the basis
of temporal priority, i.e., the date on which the water right was
first developed.2 3 The right of the earliest appropriator on a
stream is satisfied first. Junior appropriators take remaining
water. Shortage is not shared. During periods of drought, a frequent occurrence in the West, those who came late to the basin
are left with nothing.
The allocation of appropriative water rights to individuals
rather than geographically related communities, as recommended by Powell, significantly reduced the possibility that allocation and management decisions would be made for the good of
the community as a whole, or for the long-term health of the
riparian habitat.2 4 Nevertheless, adapting the archaic system of
prior appropriation to modern needs for water allocation may
have been relatively simple had Congress not also ignored Powell's recommendation to draw boundaries along topographic divides. The resulting checkerboard of federal and private land
and the decision that state law does not govern water rights on
reserved federal and Indian land mean that prior appropriation is
not the only doctrine governing water allocation on a single
water source.
C.

Reserved Water Rights

When the federal government sets aside public land for a particular purpose such as an Indian Reservation, the federal government may reserve water under federal law for that purpose.
This ability of the federal government contravenes the general
rule that state law governs the allocation and management of
water. Similar to an appropriative right, the reserved water right
is allocated on the basis of priority date.2 6 However, the priority
date of a reserved right is the date of the withdrawal of the federal land and reservation for a specific purpose, not the date of
22 See, e.g., MoNT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-301(1) (2002).
23 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-401, 406(1) (2002).
24 Tarlock, supra note 7, at 72, 79-80 (asserting that the assignment of water to

individuals rather than geographic entities has led to the degredation of watersheds).
25 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
26

Id.
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As a result, the reserved right is not

lost by nonuse, but remains held in senior status for future
development.2 8

Unlike the doctrine of prior appropriation, the doctrine of reserved rights accounts for future development in its definition.
The reserved rights doctrine also accounts for the need to share
scarce resources in its use of a single priority date for an entire
community. Nevertheless, the doctrine has its shortcomings.
The quantity of the right is vaguely defined as that amount necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation. This lack of defini-

tion offers no real protection for the right. If the scope of the
water right is undetermined, it is impossible to determine if water
use off a reservation affects the reserved water right. A tribe
seeking to protect a portion of its undeveloped water right must
first prove the extent of that right. However, no body of federal

statutory or common law exists to easily determine the quantification of the reserved water right.2 9 Observable beneficial use,

the clear criteria for quantification of appropriative rights, affords greater protection on a practical daily basis than the vague
standard of "purpose" defining reserved rights. Consider now,

reserved and appropriative rights in the same water basin.

27 Id. The Colorado Supreme Court summarized the basic attributes of a reserved water right as follows: "(1) the right may be created without diversion or
beneficial use; (2) the priority of the right dates from the time of the land withdrawal
and not from the date of appropriation; (3) the right is not lost by nonuse; and (4)
the measure of the rights is quantified only by the amount of water reasonably necessary to satisfy the purposes of the reservation." United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d
491, 494 (Colo. 1987).
28 Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908).
29 See, e.g., In re the Adjudication of Existing and Reserved Rights to the Use of
Water, Both Surface and Underground, of the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the
Fort Peck Indian Reservation Within Mont. in Basins 40E, 40EJ, 400, 40Q, 40R and
40S, Mont. Water Ct. Cause No. WC-92-1 (Aug. 10, 2001) ("Fort Peck Decree")
("After nearly one hundred years of legislation, litigation, and policy-making, there
are still no bright lines clearly and consistently delineating the [Reserved Water
Rights] Doctrine. Most of the legal issues inherent in the Doctrine remain unsettled
and hotly debated and are now complicated by decades of distrust and competing
policies ....
[Tlhere is no clear consensus among the federal courts as to how the
'purpose' of the reservation is to be determined, the proper quantification standard
to apply, or the method for quantifying the rights based on that standard."), available at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/wm/pdfs/ftpeck.pdf (last visited Sept. 17,
2003).
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Prior Appropriation v. Winters

The weaknesses in appropriative and reserved water right laws
are exacerbated when the two types of rights operate in the same
water basin. The water supply is significantly depleted in order
to satisfy appropriative rights and is further strained as senior
reserved rights are developed. As a result, junior water users see
increasing periods in which their rights cannot be satisfied. At
the same time, tribes have witnessed the explosion in population
growth along with private and federal water development in the
West with limited means to protect their senior unquantified
rights. Although the Winters Doctrine arose in 1908, the United
States did not begin actively seeking quantification of reserved
water rights on behalf of Indian tribes until the 1960s 3 0 and is
only now achieving resolution on the quantification of many of
those rights.
Without some means of coordination, reserved and appropriative rights drawing from the same resource are compatible only
to the extent that the reserved right is developed immediately
following the establishment of a reservation. 1 Yet in the vast
majority of cases, development of tribal water has lagged far behind that of their neighbors.3 2 As will become apparent in the
following sections, the lag in development on reservations costs
tribes dearly because the ensuing off-reservation development
taps the water source beyond its capacity to meet the tribes'
needs. 33
E.

The Overlay of Reclamation

The explosion in non-Indian irrigation water development,
often in water basins shared with Indian reservations, reached its
peak in the early twentieth century under the direction of the
United States Bureau of Reclamation (formerly the Reclamation
See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
Judith V. Royster, A Primer on Indian Water Rights: More Questions Than
Answers, 30 TuLSA L.J. 61, 63 (1994) ("Because of their early priority dates and
often sizable quantity, Indian reserved rights to water, if not timely recognized and
accommodated, have the potential to disrupt state appropriation systems of water
rights.").
32 Daniel McCool, Winters Comes Home to Roost, in FLUID ARGUMENTS: FIVE
CENTURIES OF WESTERN WATER CONFLIcT 121 (Char Miller ed. 2000).
33 See, e.g., Summarizing the Milk River Water Supply Study, in Milk River Valley
Lands, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Report, app. 11-12 (July 1990) (noting that the
Milk River Project is short water in five out of ten years).
30
31
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Service). The federal government has had a strong role in western water development and management throughout the modern
history of the West.34 The Reclamation Act was Congress' response to Powell's recommendation of cooperative development.35 In the Reclamation Act, Congress created a highly
imperfect approximation of Powell's ideal. The Reclamation era
represents one of the most ambitious and costly chapters in the
efforts of the United States to settle the West.
Powell's concept that federal assistance would be necessary to
develop western water was embraced wholeheartedly in the passage of the Reclamation Act.3 6 But his recommendation that settlement and development proceed slowly, apace with study and
planning, and his cautions concerning the limits on water supply
were ignored.3 7 In addition, the Act contained another serious
flaw. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act requires appropriation of
water for federal projects pursuant to state law. 38 Thus, the facilities built pursuant to this Act, passed in response to the need for
cooperative development and management of the West's waters,
simply take their place in line with all other water rights in the
basin. No barrier exists to prevent continued state recognition of
water rights in competition with a reclamation project. 39 No undeveloped water can be claimed for a project to meet future
needs under state requirements of diversion to a beneficial use.
34 Getches, supra note 7, at 6.

35 Act of June 17, 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. 388 (1902); see Reclamation
Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-526; see also ANDREWS & SANSONE, supra note 14, at 171-72
("Powell was instrumental in changing public perception of the role of the federal
government.").
36 WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 247 (The Reclamation Act passed in 1902, the year
of Powell's death.); see also ANDREWS & SANSONE, supra note 14, at 170-71 (noting
that even state governments had insufficient resources for the necessary expenditure
to harness the West's rivers).
37 WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 245-46 (Fallout from his cautionary approach led
to Powell's resignation from the Geological Survey in 1894.); see also REISNER, supra
note 15, at 5 (Powell believed the water supply was sufficiently limited that even
with large scale development of storage, most of the West would remain a desert.).
38 Act of June 17, 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-161, § 8. 32 Stat. 390 (1902); see 43 U.S.C.
§ 383; see also WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 245 (The requirement of appropriation
under state law was a major win by western Congressmen who sought to maintain
state control of water while obtaining federal funding for its development.).
39 See, e.g., Closing the Basin to Certain Permit Applications of the Mainstem of
the Milk River in Hill, Blaine, Phillips, and Valley Counties (Mont. Dep't of Natural
Res. and Conservation, Apr. 4, 1983) (final order) (Eighty years after authorization
of the Milk River Project by the Secretary of the Interior, the final order closes the
mainstem of the river to new appropriation during the irrigation season while leaving the tributaries open.).
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Yet, for all of its flaws, the Reclamation Act represents one of
the most progressive land distribution and development programs ever undertaken by a government. Its passage was
steeped in romanticism concerning the small family farm and the
wild West. n° Where reclamation projects developed agriculture
in areas of rich soil and mild climate, such as the Central Valley
of California, the ideal of the Jeffersonian family farm championed by Powell was quickly overrun by large agribusiness.4
Nevertheless, in some areas where the land and climate carried
less potential for profit, irrigation with substantial federal subsidy
rendered a family business capable of sustaining a simple existence. In these areas, the Reclamation Act gave land, employment, and hope to a class of American society that brought little
more to the West than the shirts on their backs, a willingness to
work hard, and a stubborn refusal to give up. In a marriage of
opposites that remains uncomfortable today, the chosen life of
this independent pioneer became wholly reliant on federal subsidy.4 2 Under the Reclamation Act, 9.2 million acres of arid land
received irrigation.43 Yet, few of the projects ever lived up to
their original goal of self-support. Studies by the Department of
the Interior indicate that federal subsidy covers 57%-97% of the
cost of irrigation water development per irrigated acre.44
At the same time that federal funds flowed to the private irrigation of the West, funding for development of adjacent Indian
land was entirely inadequate.4 5 Funding for most tribal development has been conditioned on the relinquishment of a portion of
the tribal water right instead of providing a federal subsidy.4 6
40 WILKINSON,

supra note 1, at 243.
supra note 14, at 169, 177; WILKINSON, supra note 1, at

41 ANDREWS & SANSONE,

250.
42 REISNER, supra note 15, at 4, 120-24 (summarizing the many bailouts of Reclamation projects through restructuring of repayment and extension of the repayment
period required on the federal capital investments in reclamation, Reisner states:
"[w]ere it not for a century and a half of messianic effort toward [manipulation of
water], the West as we know it would not exist").
43 WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 248.
44 DANIEL MCCOOL, COMMAND OF THE WATERS:

IRON TRIANGLES,

FEDERAL

71 (1987) (referencing a 1980 study by
the Interior Department's Office of Policy Analysis).
45 Id. at 125.
46 MCCOOL, supra note 32, at 125; Monique C. Shay, Promises of a Viable Homeland, Reality of Selective Reclamation: A Study of the Relationship Between the Winters Doctrine and Federal Water Development in the Western United States, 19
ECOLOGY L.Q. 547, 561 (1992).
WATER DEVELOPMENT, AND INDIAN WATER
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The history of western water development is fraught with accounts of heavy subsidies to develop and sustain projects serving
small family farms, failure to develop adjacent Indian land, and a
legal and institutional structure that makes it difficult to reconcile
the two. No where are these elements more apparent than on
the Milk River of Montana.
II
THE MILK RIVER

Inability to coordinate water management, lack of mechanisms
to respond to drought, and failure to develop tribal water resources, are three of the major issues that brought people to the
table to seek solutions in the Milk River Basin of Montana. 7
The story of this valley begins with its unique setting.
Thousands of years ago, ice pushed the Missouri River south
into its present channel in Montana, leaving an empty river bed
and a vast plain of glacial debris.4" A small stream that swells to
a river in spring with runoff from the Rocky Mountain Front began to carve its own path in the wake of the ancestral Missouri. 49
Because of its load of suspended glacial silt, Meriwether Lewis
called this stream the "Milk [R]iver."50 The Milk River has its
headwaters in the Rocky Mountain front in what is now Glacier
National Park and the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. Flows in
the Milk River prior to development of the Milk River Reclamation Project are estimated to have ranged from as high as 35,000
cubic feet per second (cfs) during spring runoff to as low as 5 cfs
during the late summer and early fall of a dry year.51
47 The first two issues are addressed in this paper. The problem of underdevelopment of tribal water rights will be addressed in a companion paper.
48 Frank Swenson, Geology and Ground-Water Resources of the Lower Marias Irrigation Project Montana, USGS Water Supply Paper 1460-B (1957).

49 Id.
50 THE JOURNALS OF LEWIS AND CLARK-Lewis 106-107 (Bernard DeVoto ed.,

The Riverside Press Cambridge 1953)
Wednesday May 8th 1805. [w]e nooned it just above the entrance of a
large river ... from the quantity of water furnished by this river it must
water a large extent of country ... the water of this river possesses a peculiar whiteness, being about the colour of a cup of tea with the admixture of
a tablespoonful of milk. [F]rom the colour of it's [sic] water we called it
Milk River.... Capt. C. could not be certain but thought he saw the smoke
and some Indian lodges at a considerable distance up Milk river [sic].
51 Natural Flow and Water Consumption in the Milk River Basin, Montana and
Alberta, Canada, USGS Water Resources Investigations Report 86-4006 (1986).
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The Fort Belknap Reservation is located primarily in the valley

of the Milk River. 2 The Reservation was established for members of the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes. 3 The river
forms the reservation's northern boundary.54
.The Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes have strikingly different histories. The Gros Ventre are thought to have separated
from the Arapaho and became known as a division of the Blackfeet Nation in the mid-1700's.55 Gros Ventre were reported
along the Milk River throughout the 1800'S,56 and were party to

the Blackfeet Treaty of 1855. 57 The Assiniboine separated from
the Sioux in the mid-1600's and were reported along the Upper

Missouri River in the late 1700's and early 1800's.58 The Assiniboine were party to the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie designating their territory in the vicinity of the Missouri and Muscleshell
Rivers.59 The Assiniboine Tribe was heavily reliant on the buffalo for sustenance and trade.6 ° Prior to the 1880's, the Milk

River Valley had abundant large game, including buffalo.6 '
Smallpox epidemics in 1780 and 1838 took their toll on the

Assiniboine.62
By the 1870's, the Gros Ventre and certain Assiniboine were
known to inhabit an area along the Milk River near the Fort Bel52 Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission Staff, Draft Technical
Report on the Compact with the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Belknap Reservation 1 (2002) (hereinafter Commission Staff, Technical Report: Fort
Belknap) (unpublished report, manuscript on file with the Montana Reserved Water
Rights Compact Commission, Helena, Montana).
53 Act of May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113 (1888).
54 Id.
55 Commission Staff, Technical Report: Fort Belknap, supra note 52, at 13.
56 Id.
57 Treaty with the Blackfeet Indians, Oct. 17, 1855, U.S.-Blackfeet Indians, 11
Stat. 657, 660.
58 Commission Staff, Technical Report: Fort Belknap, supra note 52, at 11.
59 Treaty of Ft. Laramie with Sioux, etc., Sept. 17, 1851, 11 Stat. 749, 750.
60 THE AssINIBOINE, Michael Stephen Kennedy ed. 63 (U. of Okla. Press 1961)
("To the Assiniboines, the buffalo was more than an animal. It was the staff of
life."). A written record of the Assiniboine, as with many tribes, does not exist.
Scholars must rely on oral history. "The Assiniboine" is the result of one of the
attempts to record some of that history as part of the Depression era Federal
Writer's Program of the Work Projects Administration, Montana.
61 THE JOURNALS OF LEWIS AND CLARK, supra note 50, at 105 ("After brackfast I
walked on shore Saw great numbers of Buffalow & Elk Saw also a Den of young
wolves, and a number of Grown Wolves in every direction ... in the evening we saw
a Brown or Grisley beare on a sand beach."). This was a typical day for the Lewis
and Clark Expedition in the vicinity of the Milk River.
62 Commission Staff, Technical Report: Fort Belknap, supra note 52, at 11.
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knap Agency.6 3 As the buffalo disappeared from the plains, the

tribes were moved onto smaller and smaller reservations with the
promise of agriculture by the federal government. Prior to May
1, 1888, the entire Milk River Basin within the United States lay
within the larger reservation of the Blackfeet, Gros Ventre, other
tribes and groups of Indians,6 4 and the Fort Assiniboine Military
Reservation (a smaller area wholly within the larger Indian Reservation)."

On May 1, 1888, the United States fragmented the

larger reservation into three smaller reservations: the Blackfeet
Reservation, Fort Belknap Reservation, and Fort Peck Reservation.6 6 Fort Assiniboine remained a separate military reservation
in the vicinity of what is now the Rocky Boy's Reservation.6 7
The Acts of 1888 creating the Blackfeet, Fort Belknap, and

Fort Peck Indian Reservations opened the remaining area in the
Milk River Valley to settlement.6 8 Settlement began in earnest

when the Great Northern Railroad was completed in 1890 along
the north bank of the Milk River. 6 9 Federal policy toward the

western public lands at the turn of the last century encouraged
the development of small, family-owned farms. The non-Indian
irrigation development along the Milk River occurred with the
encouragement of federal law.7 ° At the same time, federal Indian policy favored establishment of smaller reservations and

conversion of Indian people into farmers. Unfortunately, insuffi63 JOHN SHURTS, INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: THE Winters Doctrine in its
Social and Legal Context 1880s-1930s 18 (U. of Okla. Press 2000); Commission Staff,
Technical Report: Fort Belknap, supra note 52, (citing Executive Order of March 4,
1880, General Orders and Circulars, 1876-1881, Dept. of Dakota, Vol. 208, Adjunct
General Field Office, National Archives, Washington, D.C.).
64 Treaty with the Blackfoot Indians, supra note 57.
65 SHURTS, supra note 63, at 18.
66 Act of May 1, 1888, Pub. L. No. 50-213, 25 Stat. 113 (1888) ("An act to ratify
and confirm an agreement with the Gros Ventre, Piegan, Blood, Blackfeet, and
River Crow Indians in Montana.").
67 Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission Staff, Technical Report
on the Compact with the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Reservation 12
(2002) (unpublished report, manuscript on file with the Montana Reserved Water
Rights Compact Commission, Helena, Montana).
68 Two ranches on tributaries to the Milk River claim water right priority dates
prior to the May 1, 1888 opening of the land to settlement. Thus, it is clear that
settlers had already entered the Milk River Valley at the time of negotiation of the
new treaty. Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, June 25, 2002.
69 SHURTS, supra note 63, at 29.
70 See, e.g., Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. 161-284 (repealed 1976): Desert
Lands Act 1877, 43 U.S.C. 321-339 (repealed 1976).

16

J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION

[Vol. 18, 20031

cient water existed in the Milk River for the implementation of
both policies. The basin became one of the sites of the earliest
water disputes between appropriative and reserved water
rights.7 a
In 1895, farmers began diverting water from the Milk River
upstream of the Fort Belknap Reservation. 2 Three years later,
on July 5, 1898, the agency at Fort Belknap began diverting approximately 5,000 miner's inches (approximately 120 cfs) of
water from the Milk River for irrigation of reservation land.73
Although downstream irrigators both on and off the reservation
saw diminished flows as more people settled in the upper Milk
River Valley, the development of farming proceeded until severe
drought struck in 1904-1905.7' As a result, water no longer
reached the tribal diversion facilities. The United States filed
suit in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Montana to enjoin diversion of water upstream from the Fort Belknap Reservation to the extent necessary to prevent interference
with the flow of water to the reservation.
In 1908, after the case had been decided in favor of the Tribes
by both the Circuit Court for the District of Montana and the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that the Tribes had the superior right
to water and affirmed the injunction.7 6
While the United States championed this landmark case on behalf of the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes, it was not idle on
other fronts. On June 17, 1902, Congress passed the Reclamation Act establishing a fund from the sale of public lands in the
West for use in development of water for irrigation.7 7 Among
the projects recommended to Congress by the United States Geological Survey during consideration of the Act was construction
of a canal to divert water from the St. Mary River into the Milk
River to provide irrigation in the Milk River Basin.78 In 1903,
United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
See Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1906), affd, 207 U.S. 564
(1908).
73 Winters, 207 U.S. at 566.
74 SHURTS, supra note 63, at 29, 35.
75 Winters, 143 F. at 741.
76 Winters, 207 U.S. at 577.
77 See supra note 35 (establishing the Reclamation Service).
78 Commission Staff, Technical Report: FortBelknap, supra note 52, at 51-52 (citing FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE RECLAMATION SERVICE, H.R. Doc. No. 57-29
71 See Winters v.
72
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the Secretary of the Interior authorized this project known as the
Milk River Project ("Project").79
One barrier to development of the Project was the lack of
agreement on distribution of water between the United States
and Canada (then Great Britain). Distribution was complicated
by the fact that the Milk River, with its headwaters in the United
States, enters Canada for about 200 miles until it curves south
and re-enters the United States at what is known as the Eastern
Crossing. The St. Mary River simply begins in the United States
and then leaves it, heading north into some of Canada's fertile
farmland. Following the announcement of plans by the Reclamation Service to divert water from the St. Mary River into the Milk
River in its upper reaches for capture downstream from the Eastern Crossing, bulldozers lined up on the Canadian side of the
border prepared to divert the water back to the St. Mary River in
what was referred to as the "Spite Canal."8 On May 5, 1910, the
Boundary Waters Treaty was concluded.81 The International
Joint Commission Order issued on October 4, 1921 was based on
the Treaty and distributes the water of the St. Mary and Milk
Rivers between the United States and Canada.8" Canada has not
yet developed its share of the Milk River; that water is put to use
in the United States by the Project.83
The current configuration of the Milk River Project includes
diversion of water from a reservoir on the St. Mary River backing water into Glacier National Park and then to the Milk River
on the Blackfeet Reservation.84 The water is stored downstream
from the Eastern Crossing at Fresno Reservoir and downstream
of the Fort Belknap Reservation in Nelson Reservoir, an off(2d Sess. 1903) that described the Project to transfer water from the St. Mary River
into the Milk River and to irrigate 200,000 acres).
79 Id.

80 Mary Ellen Wolfe, The Milk River: Deferred Water Policy Transitions in an
InternationalWaterway, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 55 (1992).
81 Treaty between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 4, 36
Stat. 2455.
82 INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, IN THE MATTER OF THE MEASUREMENT
AND APPORTIONMENT OF THE WATERS OF THE ST. MARY AND MILK RIVERS AND
THEIR TRIBUTARIES IN THE STATE OF MONTANA AND THE PROVINCES OF ALBERTA

AND SASKATCHEWAN (Oct. 4, 1921) (order from the Commission).
83 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer,

Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (June 25, 2002).
84 Commission Staff, Technical Report: Fort Belknap, supra note 52, at 9.
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stream facility filled through a canal. 85 The Project serves approximately 100,000 acres in seven irrigation districts. 86 Five of
those districts, Alfalfa, Paradise Valley, Zurich, Harlem, and
Chinook, are upstream from and adjacent to the reservation.
These districts make up the Chinook Districts.87 The principal
irrigation in the Malta and Glasgow Districts is downstream from
the reservation.8 8 None of these districts serve land on the Fort
Belknap Reservation. In addition to the water contracted to the
districts, the Bureau of Reclamation has individual contracts with
irrigators for approximately 10,000 acres.89 Pursuant to reclamation law, the Bureau of Reclamation followed state water law in
obtaining water rights for the Milk River Project. The primary
crop grown on Project land is alfalfa.9 °
To summarize the jurisdictional morass, the Milk River has its
headwaters in Glacier National Park in the United States which
join to become the Milk River on the Blackfeet Reservation.
From these, the river receives water from the St. Mary River as
part of the Milk River Project. The river then leaves the United
States and crosses the provinces of Alberta and Sasketchewan
before returning to the United States at the Eastern Crossing. 91
Downstream from this point, the river serves seven private irrigation districts and one BIA irrigation district. It then flows past
three Indian reservations, numerous Indian allotments, and two
national wildlife refuges before it joins the Missouri River below
Fort Peck Dam. 92 Thus, there are four federal agencies, five In-

dian reservations, seven irrigation districts, one state, two Canadian provinces, and two countries managing or claiming a right to
93
water from the Milk River.
Almost a century after the Winters litigation, there is no comprehensive tool for coordinated management of water in the
Milk River Basin. Despite the Reclamation Project, the basin
remains defined by drought. The United States Bureau of Recla85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.

88 Id.
89 Id.

90 Approximately 60% of Milk River Project land is devoted to alfalfa. The remainder is used for small grains and pasture. Telephone Interview with Bill
Greiman, supra note 83.
91 Commission Staff, Technical Report: Fort Belknap. supra note 52, at 9.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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mation estimates that water for irrigation from the Project is
short in five out of ten years. That shortage will become even
more pronounced when Canada and the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes develop their shares.94 Ninety-four years after
the United States Supreme Court ruling in Winters, the water
rights of the Fort Belknap Reservation remain woefully underdeveloped. Although originally designed to serve over 10,000
acres, the Fort Belknap Indian Irrigation Project serves less than
5,000 acres.95 Absent storage, natural flows on the Milk River

during irrigation season are simply inadequate to supply water to
the entire project.9 6 Tribal lands were among those authorized
for service from the Milk River Project; however, the Fort Belknap Agency refused participation.9 7 With this background, the

following sections turn to the process established to address
these problems and the resulting solutions.
I1n
PROCESS AND SOLUTIONS

The solutions designed to meet the needs of the Milk River
Basin arose in a unique process established by the State of Montana to determine the attributes of reserved water rights within
the state. Understanding this process is required for understanding the solutions.98
94 Summarizing the Milk River Water Supply Study, Milk River Valley Lands, U.S.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION REPORT, app. at 11-12 (July, 1990). Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, supra note 83.
95 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, supra note 83.
96
Telephone Interview with Bob Levitan, Hydrologist, Montana Reserved Water
Rights Compact Commission, Helena, Mont. (June 24, 2002) (referring to analysis
using the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation HydROSS Model of the Milk River). The use
of the term "natural flow" refers to the amount of water in the bed of the Milk River
that would be present without the interbasin transfer and storage provided by the
Reclamation Project and other storage facilities, and without any diversion.
97 Commission Staff, Technical Report: Fort Belknap, supra note 52, at 27 (citing
Letter from Fort Belknap Indian Agent to George Stratton, Bureau of Reclamation
(April 26, 1918) ("Letters Sent, Local 1918," Fort Belknap Agency, BIA RG 75, Box
70, National Archives, Seattle)). At the time of the refusal the Leavitt Act, 25
U.S.C. § 386, deferring repayment of construction costs for irrigation facilities on
trust land had not been passed. Costs of irrigation on the Fort Belknap Reservation
in 1918 were already prohibitive. Commission Staff, Technical Report: Fort Belknap, supra note 52, at 30-31. Repayment obligations on non-trust land continued
after passage of the Leavitt Act.
98 Analysis of the adequacy of that process is discussed in a companion paper.
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The Montana Process

Reserved water rights occur in every major water basin in
Montana. Montana is a headwater state for the Columbia, Missouri, and Saskatchewan rivers. Twenty-eight percent of Montana is federal or tribal land, and sixty-nine percent of that land is
reserved.9 9 Of the eighty-five subbasins in Montana identified
for purposes of water right adjudication, seventy contain claims
for reserved water rights.'0 0 Ten of the subbasins comprise the
Milk River Basin. 10 1
The Montana Water Use Act'0 established a general adjudication for all water rights developed under Montana state law prior
to July 1, 1973,1' and for all federal and Indian reserved water
rights.10 4 Water appropriations made under Montana state law
after July 1, 1973 must adhere to the permit system established
by the Water Use Act. 10 5 The Montana Department of Natural
Resources and Conservation has continued to issue permits for
water use even though the adjudication of senior water rights is
not complete.' 0 6 However, due to the uncertainty of water availability pending the outcome of the adjudication, all permits are
currently provisional.10 7 A provisional permit may be modified
on finalization of the adjudication.10 8
As part of the 1979 amendments to the Montana Water Use
Act, the Montana Legislature established the Montana Reserved
Water Rights Compact Commission ("Compact Commission"). 10 9 The Compact Commission consists of:
(a) "two members of the House of Representatives appointed
by the speaker, each from a different political party;
99 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1993, Table 358 at 219.
100 MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-7-102 (2002) (identifing four water divisions in the

State: the Yellowstone River basin; the lower Missouri River basin; the upper Missouri River basin; and the Clark Fork River basin). Within those four divisions, the
Montana Water Court recognizes eighty-five subbasins for purposes of
adjudications.
to' Id.
102 MONT.CODE ANN. § 85-2-101 (2002) (passed in 1973 and amended by Senate
Bill 76 in 1979).
103 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-211 to -243 (2002).
104 MONT.CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-313, -701 to -705 (2002).
105 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-301 to -344 (2002).
106 See, e.g., Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 992 P.2d 244
(Mont. 1999).
107 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-313 (2002).
108 Id.
1
09 MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-212 (2002).
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(b) two members of the Senate appointed by the president,
each from a different political party;

(c) four members designated by the governor; and
(d) one member designated by the attorney general.""'
The Compact Commission is charged with negotiating water

rights "compacts for the equitable division and apportionment of
waters between the state and its people and the several Indian
tribes claiming reserved water rights within the state."1'1 1 The

Compact Commission acts on behalf of the state and its citizens
as a whole. Although it represents the interests of water users in
general, the Commission does not represent each individual
water user. 1 2 However, to ensure that the interests of the public
and of individual water users are addressed, two additional steps

are required by Montana law. First, negotiated compacts must
be ratified by the state legislature.'

3

Second, after ratification, a

compact must be filed with the Montana Water Court. The
Water Court then proceeds to consider the rights of individual
water users claiming water in the state adjudication. The Water

Court also enters the negotiated water right in a final decree in
which it is integrated with other water rights in the basin.

4

What allows a state to determine the process for quantification
of water rights established under federal law? To accomplish

this, a state must join the United States in a suit for adjudication
of its reserved water rights and the reserved water rights it holds

in trust for the benefit of various Indian tribes. Without an express waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress, joinder of the
United States in a suit would not be possible." 5 In 1952, as a
110 Id. at 212(2)(a)-(d). This composition of legislative and executive appointees
has never been challenged in Montana on the basis of separation of powers. Recently the California Coastal Commission, with a similar composition, has been challenged on that basis, however, the ruling may turn on the lack of fixed terms for
commissioners. Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal Commission, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 869 (Dec. 30, 2001), modified in 105 Cal. App. 4th 773A (Jan. 23, 2003).
The Montana Commissioners have fixed terms.
111 MONT.CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-701(1) (2002).
112 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-212 (2002) (indicating that "the commission is
acting on behalf of the governor").
113 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-702(2) (2002).
114 Id. at 202(3).
115 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that: "[iut is elementary that '[t]he
United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . ..
and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to
entertain the suit.'" United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). A waiver of sovereign immu-
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rider on the Department of Justice Appropriations Act, Congress
passed the McCarran Amendment, allowing the United States to
116
be joined in a state adjudication of water rights.
The United States Supreme Court subsequently concluded
that the McCarran waiver extends to suits to adjudicate reserved
water rights.1 17 The Court has further concluded that, although
jurisdiction to adjudicate reserved water rights is not exclusive in
state court, the policy of McCarran-to avoid piecemeal adjudication-counsels in favor of dismissal of federal litigation in deference to a state adjudication in progress. 118 The Court's
interpretation of the waiver of immunity under McCarran extends specifically to a general adjudication involving "all of the
rights of various owners on a given stream." 11 9
Concurrent with Montana's initiation of the statewide adjudication, the United States filed suits in federal district court to
quantify the reserved water rights associated with the seven Indian Reservations in the State of Montana.12 0 Montana successnity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." United States v.
King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969).
116 66 Stat. 560, §§ 208(a)-(c), (1952) (codified at 43 U.S.C. 666 (2001)). The relevant text of the McCarran Amendment states that:
(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1)
for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that
the United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water
rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United
States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived
any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United
States is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be
subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having
jurisdiction....
43 U.S.C. § 666(a).
117 United States v. Dist. Ct. for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
118 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
119 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618 (1963), (quoting S. REP. No. 755, 82d Cong.,
at 9 (1951)).
120 United States v. Adsit, 721 F.2d 1187 (C.A. Mont. 1983) consolidated with
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Tongue River Water Users Ass'n, 484 F. Supp. 31 (Dist.
Ct. Mont. 1979) (asserting the claims of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation on the Tongue River and the Crow Tribe of the Crow
Reservation on Rosebud Creek), dismissed Nov. 29, 1979; United States v. Big Horn
Low Line Canal, 484 F. Supp. 31 (Dist. Ct. Mont. 1979) (asserting the claims of the
Crow Tribe of the Crow Reservation on the Tongue, Big Horn and Little Bighorn
Rivers, and on Pryor, Sage, Tullock, and Sarpy Creeks), dismissed Nov. 29, 1979;
United States v. Aageson, 484 F. Supp. 31 (Dist. Ct. Mont. 1979) (asserting the
claims of the Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Reservation, the Chippewa Cree Tribe
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fully sought dismissal of the federal suits in favor of the state
adjudication.1 1 The United States Supreme Court concluded in
1983 that dismissal of the federal suits without prejudice was ap-

propriate in deference to state adjudication. 22 The Court further noted that states have the authority to assert concurrent
jurisdiction, pursuant to McCarran, provided that the state proceeding is adequate to adjudicate reserved water rights. 123 The

Montana Supreme Court subsequently concluded that the Montana Water Use Act is facially adequate to adjudicate federal re-

served water rights.' 24 It remains to be seen if the Montana
adjudication is adequate as applied. 25 Should a court eventually
determine that application of the Water Use Act is inadequate,
federal suits may be resumed. In the meantime, the settlement of

the reserved water rights may render the issue of adequacy moot.
B.

The Fort Belknap Negotiation

In 1997, after twelve years of data gathering, proposals, and
occasional false starts, the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes of
the Fort Belknap Reservation, the State of Montana, and the
United States entered serious negotiations to settle the water
rights of the Tribes.' 2 6 In January of 2001, the Tribes and the
Compact Commission presented a settlement, referred to as a
of the Rocky Boy's Reservation, the Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Peck
Reservation and the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Belknap Reservation in the Milk and St. Mary's River Basins), filed April 5, 1979, dismissed Nov.
29, 1979; United States v. Aasheim, 484 F. Supp. 31 (Dist. Ct. Mont. 1979) (asserting
the claims of the Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation on
Poplar, Muddy, Wolf, Little Wolf, and Tule Creeks), dismissed Nov. 29, 1979; United
States v. AMS Ranch, 484 F. Supp. 31 (Dist. Ct. Mont. 1979) (asserting the claims of
the Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Reservation on the Marias River), dismissed
Nov. 29, 1979; United States v. Abell, 484 F. Supp. 31 (Dist. Ct. Mont. 1979) (asserting the claims of the Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation on the
Flathead River), dismissed Nov. 29, 1979; dismissals upheld in Arizona v. San Carlos
Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
121 Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Tongue River Water Users Ass'n, 484 F. Supp. 31
(D. Mont. 1979) (dismissing the federal suit), rev'd sub nom. Northern Cheyenne
Tribe v. Adsit, 668 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1982), consolidated and rev'd sub nom. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
122 Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
123 Id.

124 State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754
(Mont. 1985).
125 Id.
126 Telephone Interview with Susan Cottingham, Program Manager, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (Aug. 1, 2001).

24

J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION

[Vol. 18, 2003]

"compact," to the Montana Legislature for ratification. 2 7 On
April 6th, 2001, the Governor of Montana signed the compact
into state law.128 Following a brief summary of the water right
agreed to in the compact, this Article assesses two important aspects of the agreement: (1) the mechanism established to coordinate water distribution and management in the face of multiple
jurisdictions; and (2) the mechanism to allow re-allocation of
129
water to meet critical needs during drought.
1.

The Water Right

The Fort Belknap Reservation is the site of the earliest United
States Supreme Court case addressing reserved water rights. In
Winters v. United States, eighty-nine years later when the parties
came to the table, no further definition of the water rights of the
Tribes was available beyond the 1908 declaration of its existence.
The Winters Court did not discuss, nor had the United States or
the upstream farmers argued, the full extent of the reserved
water right. 130 The Court affirmed the decree issuing an injunction by the lower court.1 ' The "decree" of the lower court was
an order "enjoining [Winters et al.] from interfering in any manner with the use of 5,000 inches of the waters of the Milk River in
the state of Montana.' 1 3 2 The injunction approved by the Court
in Winters, against upstream diversion that depleted the flow of
the Milk River below 125 cfs, was directly tied to the capacity of
the diversion facilities on the Fort Belknap Reservation in
1908.133 Winters did not quantify the limits of the reserved water
right necessary for future use. The limitation of the injunction to
the Tribes' developed capacity simply reflects the basic rule that
an injunction will be narrowly tailored to fit the circumstances.
127 MONT.H.B. 626, 57th Legislature (2001). The term "compact" is used in Montana law and should not be confused with an interstate compact.
128 MONT.CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002). Substantial work remains to finalize
the settlement: (1) approval by the United States requires ratification by Congress;
(2) formal Tribal approval will require a referendum vote on the reservation; and (3)
State law requires filing of the Compact with the Montana Water Court for entry of
a decree.
129 The use of the settlement to seek funding for the development of tribal water
resources will be discussed in a companion paper.
130 Winters, 207 U.S. at 578.
131 Id.

132 Winters, 143 F. at 741. The famous plaintiff named in this case was actually
Henry Winter. The case name is a typo. SHURTS, supra note 63, at 150.
133 Winters, 207 U.S. at 565.
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The defensive posture of the United States in the early 1900's
in seeking curtailment of conflicting water use rather than affirmative adjudication of the tribal water right was not limited to the
Fort Belknap Reservation. Concurrent with Winters, the United
States successfully sought an injunction in federal district court
against water diversions upstream from facilities diverting water
to the Blackfeet Reservation from Birch Creek. The Ninth Circuit held the case pending the outcome of Winters in the United
States Supreme Court, then affirmed the injunction.' 3 4 In doing
so, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the fact that the case was limited to current developed capacity. The court stated that the case
could be re-opened if necessary to provide additional water "reasonably necessary for the purposes" of the Reservation.1 35
Thus, in entering negotiations, the parties had the following
information on the tribal water right from Winters: (1) prior to
1888 the Tribes had command of all the water in the basin; (2)
the 1888 Treaty reserved to the Tribes the water necessary to cultivate the reservation; (3) that right is at least as large as necessary to serve the diversion facilities constructed in 1898; and (4)
the measure of the reserved water right is the "purpose" of the
Reservation. 136
The parties to the Fort Belknap negotiations agreed to a tribal
diversion right from the Milk River of 625 cfs, five times that
directly protected in Winters. This right was based on:
(1) the Tribes' assessment of what would be necessary for a
viable irrigation project and what could be served from a tech1 37
nically feasible off-stream storage site on the reservation;
and
(2) the assessment by the State and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation that with reasonable changes to existing Milk River
Project facilities, the Tribes'
needs along with those of their
38
neighbors, could be met.
134

Conrad Investment Co., 161 F. at 834.

135

Id.

Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
Water Rights Development Plan, Fort Belknap Indian Reservation, Montana,
(November 28, 1995), preparedfor the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes of the
Fort Belknap Indian Reservation, Montana by Natural Resources Consulting Engineers, Inc., (available from the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, Helena, Mont.).
138 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agriculatural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (June 24, 2002).
136

137
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This agreement allocates the entire natural flow of the Milk
River to the Tribes in most months, leaving the Project to rely on
continued diversion from the St. Mary's River. The ability of the
parties to agree to this interest-based solution in the Milk River
was aided by the fact that substantial room for improvement lies
within existing project facilities and that water diverted from the
St. Mary River is a significant share of the flow in the bed of the
Milk River.1 39 To allow thorough study of the alternatives for
supply of water to off-reservation irrigation and the environmental impact of such alternatives, the compact leaves the choice of
measures to be taken open until completion of environmental review by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.
The concept that growing needs can be met with existing facilities is not new, nor is it limited to the Milk River. As Professor
Wilkinson notes:
[T]he West is so extravagantly overbuilt.., so much water has
been developed, and so many water users are so wasteful...
that the water supplies in the present system, if used sensibly,
can meet most or all future needs for the foreseeable future
without investment in more structural 1 40alternatives, such as
substantial dams and stream diversions.
Although some disagreement exists concerning whether the
focus should be on conveyance facilities,'14 1 or on-farm improvements, 4 2 all parties agreed that some water supply problems on
the Milk River can be solved through improvements in efficiency. On the Milk River, as elsewhere in the West, return flows
are re-diverted multiple times downstream.' 43 Thus, although individual farm efficiency is low, basin-wide efficiency is, in theory,
high.' 44 Nevertheless, significant water is lost through evapotranspiration from conveyance facilities so that even proponents
of the basin-wide efficiency theory agree there is room for im139 Id.
140 WILKINSON, supra note

1, at 286-87.

141 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (Feb. 14, 2002).
142 John C. Dalton, Milk River on-Farm IrrigationStudy for Blamne, Phillips and
Valley Counties, prepared for the United States Bureau of Reclamation and the
Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (1999).
143 RICHARD D. LAMM & MICHAEL MCCARTHY, THE ANGRY WEST: A VULNERABLE LAND AND ITs FUTURE (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1982).
144 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (Feb. 14, 2002).
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provement.145 In addition, the Milk River Project, as with most
reclamation projects built in the early 1900s, has deteriorated in
its capacity to service irrigation due to decline in both capacity of
conveyance facilities and siltation of reservoirs.146 Thus, renova-

tion to its earlier capacity could substantially improve water supply to the Project.
2.

Getting the Water Right Delivered

The quantification of the right was easy relative to the tasks of
determining whether it is actually available, and if so, how to
guarantee its delivery. 147 Reclamation's existing accounting system allows natural flow Milk River water to be passed through

storage to the Fort Belknap diversion. 48 No system exists, however, to coordinate storage in reservoirs owned by the Project
with those owned by other entities or with the proposed tribal
reservoirs nor to account for storage allocation. Technical advisors to the negotiations determined that coordination and operation of all storage in the basin with the single goal of maximizing
water supply would contribute to water availability. 149 For example, from an efficiency viewpoint, a senior reservoir located low

in the basin and built in leaky glacial sediments (e.g., the Project's Nelson Reservoir) should not be filled before a more competent junior reservoir upstream (e.g., Hill County's Lower
Beaver Creek Reservoir).' 50 Improvements in water availability
145

Id.

Telephone Interview with Leny Duberstein, Engineer, United States Bureau
of Reclamation (Feb. 22, 2002) (The original design capacity of the St. Mary diversion facility of 850 cfs is now reduced to 650 cfs. The original capacity of the mainstream reservoir-Fresno Reservoir-of 130,000 acre-feet is not 92,000 acre-feet due
to siltation.).
147 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (Feb. 14, 2002).
148 Draft Reservoir and River Operation Guidelines Milk River Project, United
States Bureau of Reclamation 13 (Dec. 15, 1997). In 1946, BIA on behalf of Fort
Belknap, entered a contract for some storage in the Project's Fresno Reservoir to
store natural flow Milk River water, thus increasing the likelihood the Fort Belknap
Indian Irrigation Project could be served in late summer. (Memorandum of Agreement between the Bureau of Reclamation and the Office of Indian Affairs, Milk
River Project, Montana, Aug. 16, 1946). This storage allocation is part of the Reclamation's existing accounting system.
149 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (June 24, 2002).
150 Id.
146
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high in the
could be realized by holding late fall precipitation
51
basin and simply accounting to whom it belongs.1
Concerns that water once released from upstream reservoirs
would not be allowed to flow down to the appropriate headgate
were prevalent from both Tribal and private irrigators. 11 2 For
years the downstream irrigation districts of Malta and Glasgow
had accused the upstream Chinook Districts of taking more than
their fair share of water.1 53 At the same time, the Chinook Districts were seeking a means to prove they diverted only within
legal limits.1 54 All seven districts and the Tribes criticized the
Bureau of Reclamation for not only issuing additional individual
contracts to irrigate from a project already short on water but for
failing to police those contracts to assure additional water was
not taken. 155 Reclamation in turn criticized the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) for its

continued issuance of new permits to divert water from surface
water sources in the Milk River Basin. 56 Reclamation also expressed frustration with DNRC for its failure to police the river
157
for illegal diversions.
All parties and members of the public did agree that the lack
of enforcement on the Milk River had to end. 1 58 More than an
Id.
Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (Feb. 14, 2002).
153 Id.
154 Id. In a testament to the fact that nothing brings people together like adversity, faced with the prospect of a tribal settlement, the seven irrigation districts put
aside their history of accusation and formed the Milk River Joint Board of Control
under state law during the course of negotiations. This provided a (somewhat) unified voice for comment and more importantly, a logical governmental entity to participate in the future coordination of the river.
155 It appears these concerns were well founded. Studies by the Compact Commission staff indicate that individual (i.e., contracts other than the district contracts)
contracts for water to irrigate 10,000 acres are being used to apply water to 20,000
acres. Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, supra note 147.
156 See supra note 39 for the 1983 DNRC Order closing the mainstem of the Milk
River to certain new appropriations. Despite the fact that the justification for the
Closure Order was water shortage, it did not extend to the Milk River's tributaries.
157 Reclamation's frustration stems in part from a feature of Montana law. Most
western states have a State Engineer charged with the enforcement of water rights.
In contrast, prior to the 1973 development of Montana's permit system, only a state
district court in response to a complaint or petition for appointment of a water commissioner could enforce water rights. (MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-406 (2002)). This
system remains in force for all pre-1973 rights. Reclamation has never sought enforcement of rights on the Milk River in state court.
158 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, supra note 152.
151
152
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enforcement authority, however, is necessary to ensure that
water reaches the appropriate headgate. Complicating the enforcement issue is the fact that a single tract of land may, at different times of the year and under different conditions of water
flow, receive Project district water, Project direct contract water,
and water diverted pursuant to an individual state appropriative
right.' 59 To ensure appropriate enforcement, a massive accounting effort would be necessary to sort out various types of water
conveyed by the bed of the Milk River to specific tracts of land.
As part of the settlement, the parties agreed to include means
to: (1) account for and coordinate the storage and release of
water in reservoirs within the basin; (2) more accurately track the
distribution of water to land pursuant to specific forms of the
water right; and (3) enforce distribution of water from the mainstem of the Milk River. 160 From these initial goals of allocating
and enforcing delivery of the tribal water right grew an entity
designed to address issues facing the entire basin.
a.

The Milk River CoordinatingCommittee

Under the jurisdictional goulash described above, the following entities have a role in water storage and distribution in the
basin: (1) the Tribes-for new storage proposed by the Compact
and distribution on the Reservation; (2) BIA-for distribution of
water within the Fort Belknap Indian Irrigation Project;' 6 1 (3)
the Bureau of Reclamation-for storage in, and release from
Project reservoirs (Sherburne, Fresno, and Nelson), and for distribution of water to irrigation districts and individual contract
holders; (4) DNRC-for overseeing post-1973 water rights, including Hill County's right for Lower Beaver Creek Reservoir;
and (5) the irrigation districts-for distribution of water within
their canal systems and filling of Nelson Reservoir from one of
the canals.1 62 To coordinate these entities, the settlement estab159 Id.

160 Interview with Susan Cottingham, Program Manager, Montana Reserved
Water Rights Compact Commission (June 25, 2002).
161 Certain units of the Indian Irrigation Project have been quit claimed to companies formed by the individual Indian allotees who handle water distribution within
the unit. Following the Compact the companies will continue to distribute their own
water, but the Tribes will have jurisdiction over delivery to their headgates. Fort
Belknap Compact, art. IV.A.I.c., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
162 Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.2., MoNT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
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lishes the Milk River Coordinating Committee (MRCC) comprised of the following representatives:
1. Two representatives of the Tribes;

2. Three
representatives of the Milk River Joint Board of
16 3

Control;

3. One representative of DNRC;

4. One representative of the Bureau of Reclamation;
5. One representative of the Bureau of Indian Affairs;
6. One representative selected at large by the other eight
members.

164

The MRCC is geared toward representation by local
interests:
the Tribes and the private irrigation districts. Therefore, the

composition of the MRCC gives responsibility for coordinating
management of the basin as a whole to those with power over the
use of the river. 1 65 The balance between Tribal and Joint Board

(irrigation district) members was a subject of considerable debate
during negotiations. 16 6 The districts serve over 100,000 acres of

irrigated land. 167 The Tribes proposed irrigation project will
combine with their existing project for a total of 30,000 acres irrigated. 168 Due to the separate governmental status of the Tribes

and the seniority of their right, the division was not drawn strictly
on an acreage basis. 169 Furthermore, the parties sought to allow
Tribes
representation of both the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine
70
by providing for at least two tribal members.1
163 The Milk River Joint Board of Control represents the seven private irrigation
districts in the basin. See supra note 154.
164 Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.2., MON'. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
165 See, e.g., Neuman, supra note 6 (discussion of the importance of integrating
management basin-wide and to place the responsibility for that integration in the
hands of those who actually manage the allocation of the water).
166 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Right Compact Commission (Feb. 14, 2002).
167 Compact Commission, Technical Report: Fort Belknap, supra note 52, at 9.
168 Fort Belknap Compact, art. III.A., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
169 Telephone Interview with Richard Aldrich, Field Solicitor, Department of the
Interior (Feb. 14, 2002).
170 Id. Note that the seniority of the Tribes' water right gives them primary control of the Milk River's natural flow, leaving project water users to rely on diversions
from the St. Mary River and storage. This warranted a strong tribal voice on the
Committee. In addition, as noted above, the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes
have strikingly different cultural histories. A traditional faction of the Gros Ventre,
referring to themselves as "The Gros Ventre Treaty Committee," opposed many of
the elements of the settlement. Negotiators were extremely sensitive to recognizing
the possibility of separate interests among the two Tribes. Interview with Susan Cot-
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In addition to the voting membership, several other government agencies with substantial interests in the basin, were given
advisory roles. They are not, however, directly responsible for
storing or distributing water. These advisory members include:
the United States Geological Survey, which is responsible, along
with the Canadian Survey, for the daily allocation of water between the United States and Canada; the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, which purchases water for Bowdoin National
Wildlife Refuge from the Malta Irrigation District, and which is
responsible for any listing of endangered or threatened species in
the basin; the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks,
which holds state water rights for instream flow on some of the
tributaries to the Milk River, and is responsible for many of the
fishery studies in the basin; and the United States Bureau of
Land Management, which is a substantial land manager in the
Milk River Basin.
The MRCC is given the following directives by the compact
that are pertinent to this discussion: (1) consult with Reclamation on the development of operating criteria for coordination of
storage and release of water from storage; 17 1 (2) review applications for new storage in the basin beyond that contemplated by
the settlement; 172 (3) oversee a loan program for efficiency improvements in on-farm and conveyance facilities; 173 (4) coordinate a common database on use of water diverted from the Milk
River;1 74 and (5) oversee a grant program for a drought water
bank (discussed below).17 5 Formation of the MRCC with representation from all major interests in the basin allowed the parties
to introduce a degree of flexibility into water management while
limiting the water user fear that change could occur without their
input. The first four tools of the MRCC are discussed in turn,
followed by a discussion of drought, and the use of a water bank
to reallocate water.
tingham, Program Manager, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission, in Helena, Montana (June 25, 2002).
171 Fort Belknap Compact, arts. IV.C.11. and IV.C.3.e. and f., MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 85-20-1001 (2002).
172 Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.3.g., Morrr. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
173Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.8.-10., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001
(2002).
174 Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.3.d., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
175.Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.8.-10., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001
(2002).
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Consultation on Operating Criteria

Once ratified by Congress, the compact directs Reclamation to
develop operating criteria and an accounting method to provide
the maximum utilization of storage in the basin. 17 6 The role of
the MRCC is one of consultation: to ensure information on storage availability, use, and water needs are passed between entities. The lead role is given to Reclamation due to its dominance
in water development and its unique expertise in reservoir accounting in the Milk River Basin. The operating criteria are not
locked in place by the compact but may be adapted by Reclamation to address new information, more sophisticated understand177
ing of water supply and distribution, and changing needs.
Allowing operating criteria to evolve as circumstances change
is a reasonable step toward introducing flexibility into the stagnant legal regime of water management. As discussed below,
more sophisticated modeling of water supply and distribution
may enhance the efficiency of water management, allowing
changes in operation to benefit other resource values. Tools currently being introduced in the basin by Reclamation and the
Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation to
record rainfall geographically will allow more precise identification of water need on any particular day. On a broader scale,
adaptability of operating criteria allows consideration of events
such as climate change, economic change (e.g., a shift from an
agricultural economy), siltation of reservoirs, and identification
of endangered species. Without altering the law, this approach
uses the fickle nature of the resource itself as the basis for avoiding rigid rules.
Despite the strong role of tribal and private entities in the allocation of water, keeping Reclamation in the driver's seat undermines the full potential for coordination promised by creation of
the MRCC. The dominance of federal reclamation policy, which
is slow to adapt to changing circumstances, may prevent flexible
adaptation to change and tailoring of solutions to the specific cir176 Current federal policy requires ratification of tribal water right settlements by

Congress. In addition, any provision for a new action by a federal agency and for
federal funding in a settlement requires congressional authorization and appropriation. Authorization is generally included in a bill for ratification. See, e.g., H.R. 795,
106th Congress (1999), Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boys Reservation Indian
Reserved Water Rights and Water Supply Enhancement Act of 1999, availableat http./
/thomas.loc.gov (last visited Apr. 16, 2003).
177 Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.11., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
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cumstances facing the Milk River Basin. 17 8 The strength in the
process used on the Milk River is the ability to tailor solutions to
specific local problems. Placing the dominant role of water allocation and management in the hands of an entity whose policy is
set at the national level may prevent full use of that strength.
Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons to maintain national level control over a project built with federal dollars. Requirements such as consultation under the Endangered Species
Act and the National Environmental Protection Act would remain intact with federal control. A better compromise, however,
might be realized if these national requirements were made applicable to the MRCC through the pending federal legislation approving the compact, thereby allowing governance of the water
distribution system to evolve. Daily management of water allocation by the MRCC would require changes in the agreement
which allows dedication of technical staff by its members.
The dilemma between the need to integrate disparate management entities within a single water basin and the strong institutional bias against altering the traditional power structure is
certainly not unique to the Milk River Basin. 79 In the Milk
River, as elsewhere, the political difficulty of changing the traditional roles of the various governmental entities was insurmountable. 18' A decision to subject management of a reclamation
project to control of a committee with private, tribal, and state
members raises red flags throughout reclamation country. A
state like Montana with one representative in the United States
178 For example, unlike many reclamation projects, use of project water in the
basin does not exceed district contracts. However, some of the land originally identified by Reclamation for irrigation turned out to be the least efficient to irrigate.
Although many farmers have retired these lands in favor of others, without compliance with Reclamation Act requirements for reclassification of land these exchanges

are illegal. Reclassification is an expensive and time consuming process and prevents rapid reallocation of water as circumstances change or new understanding of
the land is achieved. Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer,

Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (June 24, 2002).
179 Robert W. Adler and Michele Straube, Watersheds and the Integration of U.S.
Water Law and Policy: Bridging the Great Divides, 25 WM. & MARY ENvmT. L. &

POL'Y REV. 1, 64-65 (2000) (analyzing four watershed programs: the Colorado
River Basin Salinity Control Program; the San Francisco Bay-Delta (CALFED)
Program; the Central and South Florida (Everglades) Project; and the Chesapeake
Bay Program, noting that all of these efforts "promote intergovernmental coordination rather than transfer authority from one level of government to another").
180 Telephone Interview with Susan Cottingham, Program Manager, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (Aug. 1, 2001).
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House of Representatives is unlikely to achieve congressional approval for that change. Therefore, it is understandable that the
negotiators avoided the controversy. Although the move toward
basin-wide management evident in the creation of the MRCC is
an important step, it may fall significantly short due to continued
reliance on the pre-existing structure governing control over
water.
(2)

Review of Applications for New Storage

The compact gives the MRCC the authority to veto applications for new storage in the basin beyond the new storage contemplated by the compact.1 81 The MRCC may allow new storage
in the basin if it "will result in a net increase in available water
supply" in the basin. 18 2 The compact accomplishes the long
awaited closure of the entire basin, including tributaries, to new
appropriations of water.18 3 Under Montana law, however, a
water use permit is not needed for new storage; it is needed
merely for application of the water stored to a beneficial use.
During negotiation, public concerns were raised on two points:
(1) new storage high in the basin could limit flow downstream
that could be captured by existing reservoirs and tribal storage;
and (2) until tribal storage and the new approach to coordination
are in place, it is impossible to determine whether new storage
could enhance or harm conditions in the basin.1 84
By requiring application to the MRCC and allowing review on
a case-by-case basis as understanding of the effect of development of tribal water on the basin grows, the storage provision
introduces another element of flexibility to water management in
the Milk River Basin. More importantly, the criteria for approval of new storage requires assessment of a proposed project
in the context of the water supply in the basin as a whole rather
than merely its effect on the consumptive water rights adminis181 The Compact contemplates up to 60,000 acre-feet of new storage capacity
from the Milk River, new storage on People's Creek on the Reservation, and possible modification to existing storage within the Reclamation Project.
182 Note that any project in the basin meeting this criteria remains subject to all
applicable environmental regulation under art. V.A.13., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-201001 (2002).
183 Fort Belknap Compact, art. III.., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2000); see
also supra note 39.
184 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (Feb. 14, 2002).

New Approach in Water Management or Business as Usual? 35

tered by a single entity. 185 There is a growing recognition of the
need to incorporate basin-wide planning and consequences in development decisions. 86 The incorporation of criteria that include basin-wide consequences in the water development
decisions by the MRCC is a step in that direction.
(3)

Oversight of Loan Program

The settlement establishes a loan program intended to be
funded by state and federal appropriations and overseen by the
MRCC for projects that will alleviate water shortage. 87 Studies
by the Bureau of Reclamation indicate that efficiency improvements in water use in the Milk River Basin can contribute to reduction in water shortage. 188 As noted above, there is some
disagreement over whether on-farm efficiency improvements will
actually improve water supply.' 89 All efficiency improvements,
however, may include collateral benefits that improve the ability
of irrigators to operate and conditions in the basin as a whole. In
ranking loan applications for efficiency improvements, the
MRCC must consider related benefits such as improvements in
water quality, habitat, water use efficiency, management, and
recreation.190
A provision of the Montana Water Use Act allowing the use of
the saved water (referred to as salvaged water) to expand irrigation is a major impediment to the use of efficiency improvements
to alleviate water shortage in Montana. 191 Intended to provide
incentive for the implementation of conservation measures and
to increase cultivation of land, the salvage provision does little to
improve water supply for other water users or habitat. Due to
the severity of water shortage in the Milk River Basin, the settlement eliminates the right to use water salvaged by any project
funded by the MRCC loan program or any project not funded
through the loan program that results in salvaged water that may
192
alleviate shortage in the Milk River Basin.
185 See supra note 183.
186 Getches, supra note 6, at 541.
187 Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.10, MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
188 Dalton, supra note 142.
189 Id.; see also Greiman, supra note 141.

190 Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.10.a.(3), MoNT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001
(2002).
191 MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-419 (2002).
192 Fort Belknap Compact, art. 111.1.3., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
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Incentive to participate in the loan program does not end with
the elimination of the ability to expand irrigation. Numerous
non-water related benefits can be realized through implementation of efficiency improvements. 193 For example, it is far easier
to spread water on a lazer leveled field than one with irregularities. Similarly, it is far easier to move water down a smooth canal
than one choked by weeds or with irregular changes in slope.
Presented to irrigators in the proper light, elimination of the ability to expand irrigation should not reduce interest in the loan
program.
The elimination of the expansion of irrigation from salvaged
water in the Milk River Basin is a major step in Montana water
policy. The previous law had as its driving force not only the use
of incentives to implement efficiency, but more importantly the
goal of expanding irrigated acres. This shift to allocation of salvaged water to alleviate shortage represents a recognition that, at
least in the Milk River Basin, the limit of that expansion has
been reached. Given that the basin was identified as short of
water by the United States in 1908'9' and the State in 1983,195
this recognition is long overdue.
(4)

Coordinationof a Common Database

Historic lack of enforcement of water rights on the Milk River
stems in part from lack of information. The number of entities
with jurisdiction to allocate water and the overlap of different
types of water rights applicable to the same tract of land render it
difficult for any one entity to provide oversight on where and
when water can be diverted to a specific field.
The system to record water rights in Montana was mandated
by the Montana Constitutional Convention in 1972. The new
constitution includes the requirement that the legislature "establish a system of centralized records of all water rights. ' 196 The
system established by state law to fulfill the constitutional mandate is achieved through adjudication of all water rights. This
system records attributes of a water right including the quantity
193 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (Feb. 14, 2002).
194 Winters, 207 U.S. at 566.

195 See supra note 39.
CODE ANN. § 85-2-101(2) (2002); see also MONT. CONST. art. IX,
196 MoN.

§ 3(4).
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and time of use; the purpose of use, including acres irrigated; the
priority date; the source of water; and the location of the place of
use.' 97 Although this record provides the legal basis for determining if a water right may be satisfied at a particular time given
the priorities and attributes of all the other water rights on the
same source, it does not provide all the answers. In a basin as
complex as the Milk River it does not provide a ready answer to
whether, on a particular day, under particular conditions of water
flow, with a particular amount of water released from a reservoir,
a particular headgate may remain open. Furthermore, the water
rights for an entity with authority to distribute water (e.g., an
irrigation district or a tribe) tend to be recorded in the aggregate
(e.g., 125 cfs may be diverted to irrigate 10,000 acres within specified boundaries). To provide someone with the authority to enforce water distribution on the Milk River with sufficient
information to open and close headgates on a daily basis requires
more than a mere statement of a water right.
The settlement directs the MRCC to coordinate development
of a common database that records daily diversions. 198 These instructions would appear vague had the parties not already laid
the groundwork for development of the database in the course of
preparation for negotiation. Developed initially by the staff for
the Compact Commission with substantial assistance by the irrigation districts and Reclamation, a Geographic Information Systems database is now being implemented on computers provided
by Reclamation to the Tribes, the irrigation districts, and
DNRC. 19 9 The database provides the detailed information on

daily diversion and use necessary for the enforcement discussed
below. 00 As a collateral benefit, it is rapidly becoming a tool for
more efficient management of water within the canals and fields
of some irrigation districts.2"' Numerous scholars consider that
most problems with water supply in the West have more to do
with inefficient management and distribution and less to do with

197 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-224, -234 (2002).
198 Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.3.d., MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 85-20-1001 (2002).
199 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (June 25, 2002).
200

Id.

Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, supra note 194. The database and its
use are the brainchild of Mr. Greiman.
201
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actual shortage.2 °2 The Milk River will provide an excellent field
laboratory to test these theories. The question, however, remains: How to use this carefully organized information to enforce water rights? The answer: An entity with enforcement
authority across jurisdictional boundaries is required.
b.

The Milk River Water Commissioner

Planning, coordination, and technology are of little use to a
downstream irrigator, whether tribal or individual, with a headgate opening to a dry stream. An irrigator will be the first to point
this out when asked to support a settlement. Enforcement is key
to achieving support for any settlement on a complex system.
The Fort Belknap Compact provides enforcement through the
parties' petition for appointment of water commissioners by a
state district court.20 3 The water commissioners are responsible
for measurement and distribution of water from the mainstem of
the Milk River on a daily basis.2 " Commissioners and their
counterparts within the delivery systems of irrigation districts
(ditch riders) are a familiar part of seasonal river traffic in the
arid West. Therefore, the approach is not unusual. What is unusual is the agreement to use a state court forum and to give the
commissioners authority to open and close both tribal and private headgates. Understanding this solution requires a brief examination of existing law pertaining to integrated administration
of tribal and private water rights following adjudication. Unfortunately, there is no such existing law. One line of reasoning says
administration is governed by the McCarran Amendment. Another line of reasoning says administration is governed by case
law on tribal/state regulatory jurisdiction.
The McCarran Amendment provides: "Consent is given to
join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source, or (2) for the administration of such rights . . 25
Whether the language in clause 2 gives a state (1) the authority
over daily administration of adjudicated tribal water rights, (2)
202 See, e.g., MAcDONNELL, supra note 6, at 250; Getches, supra note 6, at 541;
Olen Paul Matthews et al., Marketing Western Water: Can a Process Based Geographic Information System Improve Reallocation Decisions?, 41 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 329, 336 (2001).
203 Fort Belknap Compact, art. VII.B.3-8, MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
204 Fort Belknap Compact, art. VII.B.3., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
205 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1986).
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merely the authority to file suit should a problem occur, or (3)
whether the administration provision is applicable to tribal water
rights at all, is a matter of debate. In a deeply divided opinion,
the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that change in use of the
tribal water right on the Wind River Reservation may only occur
under state law.2 °6 Prior to this Wyoming ruling, the Ninth Circuit concluded that under the reasoning in Supreme Court cases
pertaining to state/tribal regulatory jurisdiction, Tribes have jurisdiction over water in a drainage located wholly within a reservation, 20 7 but the state has regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indian
water use on a reservation when the water source is located in
part off the reservation.20 8
Thus, the choices in court appear to be: (1) total state control
of administration; (2) checkerboard state/tribal jurisdiction to administer water on the same source, dependent on the reservation
boundary; or (3) checkerboard state/tribal jurisdiction to administer water on the same source, dependent on the status of the
irrigator as a tribal member. None of these solutions are satisfactory. The legal basis for total state authority is highly suspect
given the Ninth Circuit rulings. More importantly for negotiations, it would be politically impossible for tribal negotiators to
concede such an important point in settlement. Neither of the
checkerboard solutions provide comfort to a downstream irrigator faced with a 120-day growing season and no water. Any suit
against a diverter in another jurisdiction will begin with the question of in whose court the suit should proceed. By the time that
decision is made, the short irrigation season will have ended.
The joint filing by the Tribes, State, and the United States for
appointment of a water commissioner eliminates the checkerboard problem and the problem of control by an agency of a single governmental player in the basin. The parties seeking court
appointment have equal say in the contents of the court order
directing the activities of the commissioner. Court appointment
206 In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992) (Big Horn II). Despite the unfavorable ruling, the
Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes chose not to appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme
Court out of concern that the current Court's unfavorable view of tribal sovereignty
could result in an opinion with adverse consequences for all of Indian Country.
Katharine Collins, Water: Fear of Supreme Court Leads Tribes to Accept an Adverse
Decision, in WATER IN THE WEST: A HIGH COUNTRY NEWS READER 251-54 (Char
Miller ed., 2000).
207 Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
208 United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
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provides a greater degree of control and a more immediate forum for any challenge to the exercise of those activities than
available within the agency.
None of this explains the resort to state court. That feature
may be explained as a mere product of convenience. Montana
law already provides a detailed system for district court appointment of a water commissioner. 0 9 Use of the existing system
eliminates the need to create a process out of whole cloth. Concern that the Tribes may be conceding an important jurisdictional
issue by agreeing to a state forum should be viewed in the context not merely of what the Tribes give up but of what they gain.
Over 100,000 acres are irrigated from the mainstem of the Milk
River off the Reservation. In agreeing to a state forum, the
Tribes have also obtained agreement to an enforcement mechanism that gives them a substantial voice in the court order governing how water is distributed to those 100,000 acres.
Debates over jurisdiction to administer tribal water often lead
to discussion of tribal sovereignty. The source and scope of tribal
sovereignty is illusive. Although courts refer to its source as an
"inherent power,' 2 10 it is meaningless unless exercised.2 11 When
sovereignty is exercised over internal affairs concerning members
of the sovereign nation, it is rarely controversial. It is at the
boundaries where the sovereign rights of one government abut
those of another that the true measure of sovereignty is revealed.
At that boundary, the government that truly exercises its own
sovereignty may be the one that reaches an agreement giving it
some influence over the actions of a government whose decisions
212
affect its resources.
The Fort Belknap Indian Community has exercised its sovereignty by joining Montana and the United States in choosing a
method of enforcement for water distribution which gives the
Tribe a voice extending to the entire Milk River. The record of
its implementation on the Milk River and the judgment on
whether the compact negotiators chose well remains to be seen.
§ 85-5-105 (2001).
210 See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (concluding that the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not apply to the action of a tribal government because the source of the power of that government is inherent and is not
derived from the federal Constitution).
211 Professor Robert Miller, Lecture at Lewis & Clark School of Law (Feb. 2002).
212 Id.
209 MONT. CODE ANN.
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3.

Drought

The final tool under the authority of the MRCC is a means to
reallocate water during a drought. The Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution, which prohibits the taking of private property for a
public purpose without compensation, 1 3 combined with the
western system of water rights described above, has a chilling effect on reallocation of water on the basis of efficiency, relative
need, or as conditions and demand changes. Nothing prevents
voluntary reallocation.
The compact establishes a water bank for voluntary reallocation of water during periods of critical water shortage. 1 4 The
water bank operates through the purchase of water by the
MRCC from water users who voluntarily agree to forego the
right to irrigate a particular parcel of land in a year Reclamation
identifies as likely to experience critical water shortage.2 15 The
cause of the shortage may be low precipitation, fish and wildlife
needs, or delivery system outage due to an unexpected failure or
natural disaster. 2 16 The MRCC may then reallocate banked
water to a critical need or allow it to remain in storage. 3 7 Criteria for consideration by the MRCC in contemplating a particular
offer for temporary water banking include whether the proposed
retirement will actually contribute to the alleviation of the
shortage and whether there are additional resource benefits, including those to water quality and habitat, by the proposed
banking.2 1 8
A wide variety of reallocation programs, referred to in their
governing statutes as a "water bank," have developed recently in
the West.21 9 A water bank functions not as a true market for
213 U.S. Const. amend. V.

Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.8., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.8.a., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
2 16
Id
217 Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.8.d., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
218 Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.9., MorNT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
219 The term "water bank" has been applied to a variety of institutional mechanisms for water transfer and storage. See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 6, at 360-62
for a discussion of the following "water banks": Arizona has established a "water
bank" to provide for replacement of pumped groundwater with water from the Central Arizona Project. ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 45-2401 to 45-2471 (West 2001).
Texas and Idaho have established "water banks" to allow the "depositing" of unused water with a state entity, thus avoiding forfeiture, and the sale or leasing of the
water to another use by the state entity. TEX. WATER CODE §§ 15.701 to 15.708
(West 2001); IDAHO CODE §§ 42-1761 to 42-1764 (West Supp. 2000).
214
215
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water, allowing unrestricted buying and selling between consumers, but as a management tool involving the purchase of water by
a single governmental entity for reallocation to other uses, in220
cluding non-market uses.

Despite numerous attempts at a variety of water transfer
mechanisms, this method of reallocation of water remains relatively unused. Reasons identified include: (1) the prior appropriation doctrine, which creates rights to continue existing uses of
water;221 (2) political barriers to change due to the interconnected nature of investments dependent on the existing distribution and use system; 222 (3) high transaction costs resulting from
institutional barriers such as the legal requirement of no injury to
any other water users from the transfer; 223 and (4) insufficient

data and models to predict the effect of transfers and thus allow
managers to assess whether a proposed transfer will violate the

no injury rule. 24 Each of these concerns with water transfer are
discussed in turn in the context of the Fort Belknap Compact.
a.

The Barrier of PriorAppropriation

The Milk River water bank avoids conflict with the entitlement
aspect of prior appropriation because participation is voluntary.
Additionally, banking of water is limited to temporary transfers
during periods of drought. First, by making water transfer purely
California established a drought water bank for transfer of water through an intermediary-the State Department of Water Resources-during critical shortage. Established initially on an emergency basis after five years of drought, the Order was
later passed into state law. S.B. 970, April 20, Cal. 1999 (passing Exec. Order No.
W-3-91). See also, Andrew P. Tauriainen, California's Evolving Water Law: The
Water Rights Protection and Expedited Short-Term Water Transfer Act of 1999, 31
McGEORGE L. REV. 411, 414 (2000); and Brian E. Gray, The Market and the Community Lesson from California'sDrought Water Bank, 1 West-NW 17 (1994) (analyzing the legal issues associated with water transfer under the California drought
water bank).
220 Dellapenna, supra note 6 (asserting that due to high transaction costs and substantial external effects caused by transfers, there is no true market for water. Instead, the author describes the various forms of "water banking" as the use of
economic incentives for management.).
221 Dellapenna, supra note 6, at 346.
222
Janis M. Carey & David L. Sunding, Emerging Markets in Water: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Central Valley and Colorado-Big Thompson
Projects, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 283, 324 (2001).
223 Id. at 305. Under Montana law, the no injury requirement is that the change
will not "adversely affect the use of the existing water rights of other persons."
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-402(2)(a) (2002).
224 Matthews et al., supra note 203, at 329.

New Approach in Water Management or Business as Usual? 43
voluntary, the water bank cannot be challenged under the Fifth
Amendment takings provision. Second, the temporary nature of
the transfer assures that the water right will not only remain in
the name of the water right holder as a matter of law, but as a
matter of equity or politics, beneficiaries of the transfer will not
develop a reliance on the additional water. Based on projections
from historic records, a critical shortage is expected one in every
five years.22 5
One possible concern is that a voluntary system will never generate sufficient participation to cover critical needs.2 2 6 The reality of water availability in the Milk River when a critical shortage
occurs means that many irrigators will experience a shortage. 27
Given the choice between no water and no water plus money,
irrigators indicated at public meetings during negotiations that
they would choose the money. 2 8
b.

Dependent Investments

By providing for limited irrigation retirement only in critical
years, the Milk River water bank avoids permanent loss to local
economies. Interdependent investments in regions like the Milk
River include not just the water user's investment in her farm but
the investment of the surrounding community in items such as
inventory in farm implements and the provision of farm labor. 2 9
Economic loss in these sectors is minimized by the temporary
nature of the retirement. The subsidy provided by the water
bank program covers unavoidable costs, such as yearly required
payments by irrigators to irrigation districts and Reclamation,
and county taxes, all based on assessment of irrigated acreage.
Therefore, in addition to making up for lost income to the irrigator, the communities may be better off than under prior condi225 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (Feb. 14, 2002).
226 See, e.g., Cary and Sunding, supra note 222 (analyzing the difference between
water marketing programs in the Central Valley, California and the Big-Thompson
Project, Colorado, to understand why certain programs generate few transfers).
227 A critical shortage occurred in the Milk River in 1988. Water available from
the Reclamation Project was 50% of need. In an average year, Project supply is
generally 80% of need. Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (Feb. 14, 2002).
228 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (Feb. 14, 2002).
229 Cary & Sunding, supra note 223, at 325.
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tions of drought where some farms generated insufficient income

to meet these obligations.
c.

Transaction Costs

The transaction costs associated with water transfers are reduced in the Milk River water bank by providing a single entity
as the clearing house for deposit and reallocation of water 230 and

by limiting transfers to within the basin. 231 Nevertheless, certain
transaction costs remain. The MRCC first ranks applications for
grants to bank water (using such factors as the degree to which
the particular retirement will assist in alleviating shortage and on

secondary benefits to other resource values).232 The Montana
Department of Natural Resources (the entity designated to man-

age the funds for the grant program) may then issue the grant if
the applicant has a valid water right and a legal right to transfer
the water.23 3
Under Montana law, a legal right to transfer water requires a

showing of no injury to other water users.234 Critics of "no injury" rules argue that the requirement imposes unreasonable
barriers to transfers.2 3 5 The criticism fails, however, to recognize

one of the primary functions of no injury rules. No injury determinations provide a process for determining the equivalence be-

tween the existing use of a water right and a new use, thereby
preventing transfer of a larger right than actually existed. How-

ever, in the absence of detailed and highly accurate modeling
(discussed below) it is nearly impossible to determine if a new
point of diversion or new type of use is actually equivalent to,
and thus within the limits of the prior right.2 3 6 Asking other
230 Compare the limited success of water marketing programs in which buyers and
sellers must find each other (e.g., the Central Valley and Big-Thompson Projects
described by Cary and Sunding, supra note 223), with the success of those with a
central clearing house (e.g., the California Drought Water Bank described by
Tauriainen, supra note 220).
231 See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 6 (discussing the fact that the lack of facilities
to convey water from seller to buyer will prevent development of a true "market"
for water).
232 Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.9., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
233 Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.9.c., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001 (2002).
234 MONT.CODE ANN. § 85-2-402 (2002).
235 See, e.g., Cary and Sunding, supra note 223, at 305.
236 Much of the criticism of no injury rules focuses on the barrier the rules present
to transferring water to instream flow. However, it should be noted that in states
that allow a water right for instream flow, such as Montana, change in use is just as
likely to harm an instream flow right as a third party right. For example, moving a
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water users on a system who have knowledge of the detailed way
in which water is distributed and used on a daily basis serves the
purpose of providing a context for the determination that the
new use equals the old use. Given this information function, it is
neither likely nor prudent for states to eliminate no injury rules.
The transaction cost imposed by this requirement is unavoidable.
d.

Using Technology to Reduce Transaction Costs

Developments in information management and modeling may
assist managers in making determinations of no injury, thus reducing transaction costs. Consider the problem faced by the
MRCC, not only by the no injury hurdle, but also by requiring a
determination of whether "the proposed water banking will alleviate significant short-term water shortage in the Milk River Basin. '
Similar to a no injury determination, this requires an
assessment of both the effect of foregoing the former diversion
and the loss of any return flow it would have generated. Geographers at the University of New Mexico point out that these types
of determinations require an ability to model the change both
spatially and temporally on a scale appropriate for the decisions
being made.23 8 Current methods of modeling, however, such as
those used to evaluate water supply for negotiations on the Milk
River, do not resolve information on a fine enough scale in either
space or time. Such resolution is necessary to access the daily
management issues that must be considered in order to determine the third party and environmental effects of temporary retirement of a single parcel of irrigated land.2 39 The University of
New Mexico researchers advocate development of Geographic
Information System (GIS) based models to achieve this end. 4 '
A GIS model integrates data (such as diversion rate, rainfall,
crop needs) by geographic location through a process analogous
diversion point upstream reduces flow in the intervening stretch of river even
though no change in net depletion of water may occur. The Montana Department
of Fish, Wildlife and Parks holds instream flow rights on several of the tributaries to
the Milk River that could be harmed by a change in diversion point. Telephone
Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water
Rights Compact Commission (June 25, 2002).
237 Fort Belknap Compact, art. IV.C.9.a.(2), MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-1001
(2002).
238 Matthews et al., supra note 203, at 331-32.
239 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (Feb. 14, 2002).
240 Matthews et al., supra note 203, at 368.
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to map overlays. a41 GIS is currently used primarily as a tool to
relate geographic information and not as a means to model the
effect of a change in factors at one geographic location. The potential, however, does exist.242 The detailed GIS database described above under development for the Milk River may lay the
groundwork for further development of a predictive model.2 43
e. Subsidy
It is necessary to discuss the fact that the Milk River water
bank relies on payments to irrigators to forego the right to irrigate in years that are so short of water that damage to fisheries or
impacts on drinking water supply occur. 24

Payments will be

made from a fund that will be established through state and federal appropriations. This subsidy is likely to draw critical questions. Why pay irrigators to stop diverting water when their
diversion will cause, for example, serious environmental harm?
Why pay irrigators receiving water from a reclamation program
built with federal dollars? 245 Subsidy opponents argue that no
"title" to water includes the right to use that water in a manner
that amounts to a nuisance. Limiting use to prevent harm to
others who rely on the shared resource is simply one of the obligations a water right holder assumes when obtaining a use right
to a public resource.2 46 The counterargument considers a water
Id. at 366.
Id. at 368.
243 Telephone Interview with Bill Greiman, Agricultural Engineer, Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission (Feb. 14, 2002).
244 Because municipal needs in the Milk River are relatively small, impacts on
drinking water due to low flows are more likely to be due to poor water quality than
actual water shortage.
245 Irrigators in the Milk River Project have repaid the initial federal investment
in the federal project. Nevertheless, low interest rates and extended repayment periods amount to substantial taxpayer subsidy of the Project. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax,
Selling Reclamation Water Rights: A Case Study in FederalSubsidy Policy, 64 MICH.
L. REV. 13 (1964) (arguing the benefits from sale of water from a Reclamation project should go to the project, not the individual); Raymond L. Anderson, Windfall
Gains from Transfer of Water Allotments within the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, 43 LAND ECONOMIcs 265 (1967) (arguing that individual profits from sale of
water from a Reclamation project are necessary to provide incentive to transfer
water).
246 See, e.g., Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulane Case: Water Rights, the Endangered Species Act, and the Fifth Amendment, 32 ENvTL. LAw 551, 559 (2002).
241

242
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right as an absolute property right that can be allocated to another use only on payment of just compensation. 47
Given that the right to use water is merely a use right, that
water is a shared resource, that the Montana Constitution speci2 48
fies both state ownership of water for the benefit of the people
and the right to a "clean and healthful environment, '249 it is unlikely that the absolute property rights argument will prevail in
Montana. More importantly for this discussion, neither the nuisance or property rights legal arguments address the practical reality faced by inhabitants of a water basin like the Milk River.
Without federal assistance, the changes necessary to the current system of water allocation in the West are unlikely to occur. 250 As a practical matter, westerners cannot continue to use
water in a manner that is so detrimental to water quality that it
destroys the water's value for any other use 25 or so harmful to
riparian and fisheries habitat that it destroys many of the amenities that brought them to the West. 52 At the same time, in pursuing a policy of federal development of water in the early 1900s,
combined with below-cost grazing leases to the same farmers receiving irrigation water, the nation built a house of cards. After
an initial attempt to recover the cost of reclamation projects from
irrigators, Congress started down the subsidy path by extending
repayment periods, charging some of the project costs to hydro2 53
power, and by recalculating fees on the basis of ability to pay.
Current Milk River irrigation district and reclamation mainte247 Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313,
318-319 (2001).
248 MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (1972).
249 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1972).
250 MACDONNELL, supra note 6, at 252-253.

251 Freshwater fish are considered by the Biological Resources Division of the
United States Geological Survey to be the single most endangered vertebrate group
in the United States. Holly Doremus, Water, Population Growth, and Endangered

Species in the West, 72 U. CoLo. L. REV. 361, 366 (2001). Of the 68 freshwater fish
listed under the Endangered Species Act in the West, 50 have agriculture listed as a
factor in their decline. Michael Moore. Aimee Mulville, & Marcia Weinberg, Water
Allocation in the American West: Endangered Fish Versus Irrigated Agriculture, 36
NAT. RESOURCES J. 319, 321, 328 (1996).
252 The Environmental Protection Agency reports that more than one third of the
nation's rivers are use-impaired due to poor water quality. Sarah B. Van de Wetering & Robert W. Alder, New Directions in Western Water Law: Conflict or Collaboration?, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES AND ENVTL. L. 15, 19 (2000) citing U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVEN-

1996 (1998).
253 MCCOOL, supra note 44, at 68; Andrews & Sansone, supra note 14, at 176-77.
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nance costs alone exceed the calculated ability of irrigators to
pay.254 Furthermore, whether the water is released for irrigation
or for instream flow, the maintenance costs are incurred.255
Whether they are paid directly by taxpayers under a policy to
change the use of the water or by the irrigator through a taxpayer
funded grant program, the Project maintenance cost is the same.
State, federal, and Tribal parties to the Fort Belknap negotiations avoided the legal issue of whether a right to water is an
absolute property right. Instead, they made the policy decision
that in incurring those costs a preference was given to maintain
the existing way of life in the Milk River Basin. Given the reality
that state legislative and congressional approval of an agreement
requires local support, and more importantly, that any agreement
without local support will be nearly impossible to implement on a
daily basis, it is difficult to argue that they could have made any
other choice.256 In addition, through establishment of the
MRCC and the grant and loan program, the parties gave the basin the institutional tools necessary to work and to contemplate
change in the economic base in the valley.
The temporary transfer program established as the Milk River
water bank will be an interesting experiment in water reallocation. The ability, however, to alleviate many of the problems in
the basin through only temporary transfer is a direct function of
the wide variation in water supply on the Milk River and the
relatively constant level of demand (e.g., lack of any growing urban center). Water basins experiencing growing urban or habitat
demands may find it necessary to explore programs that use a
mixture of temporary and permanent retirement of certain water
uses.

254 Telephone Interview with George St. George, Economist, United States Bureau of Reclamation (Feb. 15, 2002); see also, Andrews & Sansone, supra note 14, at
176-77 (noting that under the repayment terms, Reclamation project irrigators "may
end up paying little more than current operating expenses").
255 Prior to the transfer of water from the St. Mary's River to the Milk River, the
Milk River often ran dry in summer. See Natural Flow and Water Consumption,
supra note 51. Thus, the current aquatic life in the Milk River is artificially supported by the interbasin transfer, and maintanence of instream flows in summer
would require releases from Project reservoirs.
256 See supra Part III for an evaluation of the constraints imposed on solutions by
choosing a political process to resolve disputes over water allocation.
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CONCLUSION

In many ways the Fort Belknap Compact is just a bandaid. It
continues the reliance on the Milk River Project. It establishes a
process intended to shore up a project that may have outlived its
usefulness. However, it does so by working within an existing
infrastructure, recognizing not only that the cost, huge subsidy,
and environmental damage caused by damming the West make it
unlikely that large new projects will be built but also that the
inefficiency of projects built in the early 1900s provide considerable room for changing operations and use to meet current needs.
Although it remains to be seen whether funds obtained to implement the compact will be spent on projects that improve the efficiency of water use in the basin and reduce environmental costs,
the compact does establish institutions that set the stage for the
residents of the valley itself, in the spirit of John Wesley Powell,
to resolve future water problems within the basin. The compact
does this by setting up a system of coordination between disparate governmental entities, thus providing a forum for future dialogue on the direction of the valley with respect to water. The
compact sets the stage for solving some of the problems associated with fluctuating supply by reducing demand during drought
rather than building yet more supply off the reservation (albiet
with the assistance of subsidies). Finally, the compact provides a
mechanism to remove over a century of inequity between subsidized non-Indian agriculture and relative neglect of development
and maintenance of irrigation on Indian land.
The Fort Belknap Compact is a temporary solution to water
use problems indeed, as is any that continues the reliance on the
subsidized harnessing of the West's rivers. It is, however, a major
institutional step beyond the solutions offered by the existing
doctrines of prior appropriation and reserved water rights and
the political barriers to coordination between the two. As
pointed out by many farmers during the course of negotiations,
irrigated agriculture is a dying business in valleys like the Milk
River. Future generations may no longer be willing to pay the
prices required by this hard life. What the compact recognizes
and sets the stage for, is that the answer to what comes next must
be generated through a dialogue among those involved locally in
water use. This approach recognizes that any attempt at wholesale reformation of federal and state water policy risks creating
even larger problems than those driving people to negotiate to-
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day. The Milk River is not the same as the Central Valley of
California. The Fort Belknap Reservation is not the same as the
Flathead Reservation of Montana. The cookie cutter approach
to solving western water problems has failed for over 100 years.
It is time to try a new path. Though the solutions must continue
to evolve if westerners ever hope to develop a sustainable economy in the rural West, the groundwork has been laid for a dialogue and a process to do so. The Montana process may indeed
represent one of the forerunners of a new era in water distribution and management in the West.

